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The fate of minority preference programs is one of the major civil
rights policy questions that will be determined in the 1990s. The
merits of these minority preference programs have become increas-
ingly controversial; debate has raged in the media, in the legisla-
tures, and in the courts.' Proponents claim that these policies are
responsible for tremendous progress in minority employment and
business ownership and therefore are necessary to reverse en-
trenched patterns of racial discrimination that the marketplace has
failed to ameliorate. 2 Critics argue that the programs are overbroad
and superfluous since there is no evidence of specific discrimination.
I. See e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (whenever a
policy uses racial classifications, regardless of its benign intent, strict scrutiny is required);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (where the Court upheld a set-aside policy
created by Congress which was of limited duration, flexible, and did not impose an un-
due burden on innocent third parties); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267
(1986) (where the Court held that a program which gave priority to minority teachers
during lay-offs was unconstitutional because it did not remedy specific discrimination)
and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989) (where the Court held
that a city policy requiring a 30 percent set-aside for minority subcontractors was uncon-
stitutional since it was not narrowly tailored to address any discriminatory violation).
2. Telephone interview with James L. Winston, Executive Director and General
Counsel of the National Association of Black Owned Broadcasters, Inc. [hereinafter NA-
BOB] (April 24, 1989) (indicating that many of his members have been able to acquire
broadcasting properties as a result of the Federal Communications Commission's [here-
inafter FCC] minority preference programs).
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They add that the programs benefit only "rich minorities," and re-
sult in sham transactions.3 Consequently, these critics contend that
the programs are ineffective. 4
Some of the preference programs were developed in the late
1960s in response to the Kerner Commission report, which recom-
mended policies to encourage greater employment and business de-
velopment for minority groups historically left out of the economic
mainstream. 5 This led to a number of new programs that either set
aside opportunities or assigned a "plus factor" to minorities.6 For
example, noting the Kerner Commission's criticism of the media for
failing to cover or accurately portray the African-American commu-
nity,7 the FCC initially responded by developing "race neutral" poli-
cies to encourage minority employment and to require broadcasters
to ascertain the needs of various community groups to ensure that
diverse views would be broadcast.8 However, as both the courts and
the Commission came to realize, neither the equal employment op-
portunity ("EEO") nor the ascertainment policies were solving the
problem of minority underrepresentation. 9 Consequently, the FCC
3. For example, in the broadcasting industry, when minorities, with little or no eq-
uity investment and with no intention of staying in broadcasting, purport to control an
interracial group which acquires a broadcasting station using a minority preference, the
transaction is commonly called a sham. See infra p. 410.
4. Rudnitsky, How the Rich Get Richer, FORBES, May 15, 1989, at 38 (claiming that tax
certificates, one of the FCC's minority preference programs, have done little more than
enrich already rich corporations or wealthy minorities at the expense of taxpayers).
5. When widespread urban rioting occurred throughout the United States during
1967, President Johnson appointed the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disor-
ders (the "Kerner Commission") to analyze the reasons for the the disturbances and to
make recommendations to prevent their reoccurrence. KERNER COMMISSION, REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 3 (1968) [hereinafter KERNER
REPORT].
6. For example, in 1968, the SBA created a set-aside program which reserved a por-
tion of federal contracts for minority-owner firms. See Garcia, Experts Debating How to
Help Minority Business, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 6, 1990, at Al.
7. KERNER REPORT, supra note 5, at 10. The Commission recommended that there
be expanded coverage of the African-American community through "better links" and
the increased integration of African-Americans in all aspects of the industry.
8. While certainly the KERNER REPORT was a major catalyst in the development of the
FCC's policies, another factor was the increased activism of civil rights groups which
brought suits and initiated other legal actions demanding that broadcasters be more
representative of minorities. See Honig, The FCC and its Fluctuating Commitment to Minority
Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 27 How. LJ. 854, 864 (1984) (indicating that litigation
and protest by citizen advocacy groups influenced the development of the FCC's EEO
policies which caused an increase in minority employment in the broadcasting industry).
By "race neutral" I mean policies that do not allocate preferences based on racial
classifications.
9. In both 1977 and 1979, the United States Commission on Civil Rights released
studies which documented the serious underrepresentation and stereotyping of women
and minorities on prime time -television. See UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, WINDOv DRESSING ON THE SET: WOMEN AND MINORITIES IN TELEVISION (1977)
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began developing minority preference policies to encourage minor-
ity ownership by awarding "qualitative enhancements" for minority
ownership in comparative licensing hearings;' ° issuing tax certifi-
cates that permit the seller of a broadcast facility to defer capital
gains taxation when selling to minority-owned or controlled
groups; I and permitting licensees designated for a revocation hear-
ing to sell their licenses to a minority-controlled group at a distress
sale price, which can be no more than 75% of the fair market
value. 12
The FCC's minority preference programs have faced numerous
constitutional challenges in the courts.' 3 Challengers have claimed
that the minority preference policies are unconstitutional because:
(1) there is no evidence of racial discrimination in the broadcasting
(hereinafter WINDow DRESSING] and WINDOW DRESSING ON THE SET: AN UPDATE (1979)
[hereinafter WINDOW DRESSING II]. For explanations of the EEO and ascertainment pol-
icies, see infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
10. TV9 Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974),
established the precedent for awarding a qualitative enhancement for minority owner-
ship on the grounds that such ownership was likely to lead to greater programming
diversity. The awarding of a qualitative enhancement for minority ownership is not de-
terminative of the award of a license. Qualitative enhancements are considered only if
no applicant has a clear quantitative advantage or prevails under Section 307(b) of the
Communications Act. See Winter Park Communications v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347, 353-54,
(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. granted sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 715-
54 (1990). For a fuller discussion of the minority qualitative enhancement, see infra p.
387.
11. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.
2d 979, 982-83 (1978) [hereinafter Minority Ownership Policy Statement].
12. Id. at 983. The FCC discontinued the minority preference in distress sales fol-
lowing Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
See Minority Broadcast Ownership: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications, Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (1989) (Statement of Roderick K. Porter,
Deputy Chief, Mass Media Bureau, FCC) [hereinafter Porter testimony].
13. On June 27, 1990 the Supreme Court held that these policies are constitutional.
Ruling 5-4 in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, S.Ct. -, (1990 WL 85319), the Court
said that "benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress... are constitution-
ally permissible." Prior to that, courts sent mixed signals on the issue. See, e.g., West
Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1027 (1985) (affirming minority enhancement as a rational means of encouraging mi-
nority ownership which would result in more diverse viewpoints); Steele v. FCC, 770
F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (the FCC's preference for female ownership was held uncon-
stitutional §ince it bore no rational relationship to the accomplishment of program di-
versity); Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
cert. granted sub nom., Astroline Communications Co. v. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hart-
ford Inc., 110 S. Ct. 715 (1990) (FCC's minority preference in distress sales held to be
unconstitutional since it was not narrowly tailored enough to meet the objective of
either remedying past discrimination or promoting program diversity); Winter Park
Communications Inc. v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989) cert. grantedsub nom. Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 715 (1990) (court upheld the minority preference
in comparative hearings since it was "but one factor in a competitive multifactor selec-
tion system that is designed to obtain a diverse mix of broadcasters").
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industry;' 4 (2) programming diversity is not clearly a compelling
government interest which justifies the use of racial classifications;' 5
(3) there is no proven nexus between program diversity and minor-
ity ownership;' 6 (4) the policies are not narrowly tailored and have
not resulted in greater minority ownership;1 7 and (5.) the policies
violate the equal protection rights of non-minorities.' s Studies that
clarify these policy issues are particularly important today since one
of the lingering impacts of the Reagan Administration has been the
assumption that the marketplace, rather than affirmative govern-
ment policies, provides the most effective means of placing minori-
ties in the economic mainstream.1 9 Moreover, courts, when
analyzing the constitutionality of minority preference or set-aside
programs, have indicated that there is a lack of data justifying that
these policies are needed.2 0
Since most commentators have focused on constitutional issues
when analyzing the FCC's minority preference programs,2 1 this Cur-
rent Topic will present another perspective by testing the validity of
some of the general criticisms of minority preference programs
within the context of the experience of African-American radio
14. See Shurberg, 876 F.2d at 914.
15. Id. at 926.
16. Id.
17. Brief for Petitioner at 4, 13, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, cert. granted, 110
S.Ct. 715 (1990) (No. 89-453).
18. Id. at 16.
19. Deregulation and shifting the government's role in guaranteeing civil rights
from an active advocate to an observer has negatively impacted minorities. For exam-
ple, deregulation of the radio industry, which lessened most of the FCC's ascertainment
and news requirements, is perceived as indirectly causing minorities to lose jobs. Tele-
phone interview with James L. Winston, supra note 2. There have also been numerous
complaints that EEO regulations have not been stringently enforced. See Presentation of
Anthony L. Pharr, Office of Communication, United Church of Christ, FCC EEO Con-
ference (Jan. 23, 1989).
20. See, e.g., Croson, 109 S.Ct. at 727 (indicating that none of the evidence presented
points to identified discrimination in the Richmond construction industry), and Shurburg,
876 F.2d at 915 (indicating that there is not adequate evidence to demonstrate that
minority underrepresentation is the result of past discrimination rather than the fact that
minorities may be "disproportionately attracted to industries other than broadcasting.")
21. See, e.g., Comment, The Female Merit Policy in Steele v. FCC: "A Whim Leading to a
Better li'orld?", 37 Am. U.L. REv. 379 (1988) (arguing that the FCC female merit policy is
constitutionally permissible); Comment, The Constitutionality of the FCC's Use of Race and
Sex in the Granting of Broadcasting Licenses, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 665 (1989) (arguing that the
FCC's merit policy for minority ownership in comparative hearings is constitutional);
Comment, Constitutionality of Affirmative Action Regulations Imposed Under the Cable Communi-
cations Policy Act of 1984, 35 CAm. U.L. REv. 807 (1986); but see Honig, The FCC and its
Fluctuating Commitment to Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 27 How. LJ. 854, 860
(1984) (indicating that the FCC's minority ownership policies have had little impact be-
cause they operate "in the context of the severe financial impediments and shortages of
desirable new frequencies facing minority entrepreneurs").
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broadcasters. To determine whether minority broadcasters encoun-
ter discrimination in the acquisition and operation of their stations,
and whether there is a nexus between minority ownership and di-
verse programming, I interviewed twenty African-American broad-
casters who collectively own approximately 30% of all African-
American-owned radio stations in the United States. 22
Section One of this Current Topic analyzes the minority prefer-
ence programs of the FCC within the policy context of carrying out
two compelling government interests: remedying past discrimina-
tion and ensuring diverse viewpoints on the public airwaves. Sec-
tion Two discusses the methodology and the sample group used in
the study. Section Three analyzes the obstacles, based on the sur-
vey results, often faced by African-Americans in acquiring and oper-
ating radio broadcast facilities. Section Four analyzes the nexus
between minority ownership and diverse programming using the re-
sults of the survey and other studies. Section Five analyzes the im-
pact of the policies on increasing minority ownership of radio
broadcast facilities, and makes some preliminary recommendations
which might prevent the abuses that occur in sham transactions.
Section Six concludes that the policies have been effective.
This Current Topic makes three arguments based on the survey
findings. First, many African-Americans have encountered obsta-
cles in their attempts to acquire and operate radio stations, which
may result from racial discrimination. Second, African-American
broadcasters are likely to offer diverse programming either directly
by targeting their program format toward African-American audi-
ences, or indirectly, by including public service information perti-
nent to minorities even when their stations are not ethnically
formatted. Their ownership is also likely to result in other benefits
to African-Americans such as increased accessibility to community
organizations and beneficial employment and purchasing policies.
22. Although these minority preference policies also apply to television broadcast-
ers, this Current Topic focuses on radio broadcasters, who make up the vast majority of
African-American owners. As late as 1971, there was not a single African-American
owned television station. Brief for the Federal Communications Commission at 7, n.4,
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 715 (1990) (No. 89-453) [here-
inafter FCC Brief]. In 1986, African-Americans owned 21 television stations out of a
total of 1,262. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, MINORITY BROADCASTING
FACTS 6, 9 (1986) [hereinafter NAB FACTS].
Interviewees were selected from lists of minority broadcasters that were provided by
the National Association of Broadcasters and NABOB. An attempt was made to survey a
representative cross-section of African-American radio broadcasters by looking at such
factors as geographic location, distribution of AM and FM frequencies and the extent of
multiple station ownership. See infra Appendix A for the list of interviewees.
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Finally, the minority preference policies have been effective in in-
creasing African-American ownership of broadcasting facilities.
L The FCC's Minority Ownership Policies
A. Diversification Doctrine
The FCC has rationalized its minority ownership policies as part
of its public interest mandate to protect the First Amendment rights
of the American public by ensuring that the public airwaves contain
diverse viewpoints. 23 This diversification doctrine has developed
over the years both by statute and through the courts. The FCC is
empowered by the Communications Act of 1934 to issue licenses to
broadcasters and to make rules and regulations "as public conven-
ience, interest, or necessity requires." 24 However, the Communica-
tions Act does not specifically define "public interest." The courts
have construed the public interest mandate to mean that the FCC
must guard the First Amendment rights of the American public by
ensuring the broadcasting of diverse viewpoints. 25 Although in ear-
lier decisions courts have rationalized the need for program diver-
sity based on the scarcity of broadcasting frequencies, 26 recently in
Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC2 7 the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia upheld the FCC's decision that the fairness
doctrine no longer served the public interest, since the growth in
broadcast outlets eliminated the need for the doctrine. Although
some have cited the Syracuse decision as proof that policies promot-
ing minority ownership diversity must also be considered unneces-
sary,28 the FCC has rejected this interpretation and stated that the
demise of the fairness doctrine has no impact on current minority
ownership policies. 29
B. Expressions of Minority Viewpoints: Race Neutral Policies
Although the diversification doctrine initially emphasized the im-
portance of broadcasting diverse opinions in order to protect the
First Amendment rights of the American public in general, after the
23. See TV9 Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986
(1974).
24. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1).
25. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
26. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
27. 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 717 (1990).
28. See Shurburg, 876 F.2d at 921.
29. FCC Brief, supra note 22, at 31 n.25.
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mid-1960s and early 1970s a new dimension was added: the impor-
tance of expressing minority viewpoints stecifically. As a result of
social and political pressures, the FCC sought to ensure the inclu-
sion of minority viewpoints with two race-neutral policies: improv-
ing minority employment opportunities and ascertainment.
Beginning in 1968, the FCC's EEO requirements mandated
broadcasters to comply with specific EEO guidelines,30 and to sub-
mit an affirmative action program. Failure to comply with these re-
quirements could affect a broadcaster's ability to renew his license.3 l
The ascertainment policy, initiated in 1971, required broadcasters
to consult with community leaders to determine issues of concern.3 2
Broadcasters were required to submit information from their ascer-
tainment surveys when they applied for license renewal.3 3
However, it became increasingly obvious that neither these race
neutral policies3 4 nor the marketplace were solving the problems of
minority underrepresentation in the broadcasting industry.3 5 In
both 1977 and 1979, the United States Commission on Civil Rights
released studies that documented the serious underrepresentation
and stereotyping of women and minorities on prime time televi-
sion.3 6 Six years after the FCC's EEO policies were implemented,
African-Americans and other minorities still held a small percentage
of management jobs in the broadcast industry. In 1977, according
30. Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimina-
tion in their Employment Practices, 13 F.C.C.2d 766, 772 (1968).
31. See Nondiscrimination Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 18
F.C.C.2d 240, 244 (1969) [hereinafter EEO I].
32. See Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants,
27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971).
33. In 1981, many of the FCC's ascertainment requirements were reached as part of
its deregulation of the broadcasting industry. See In the Matter of Deregulation of Ra-
dio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 973 (1981) [hereinafter Deregulation Statement].
34. Other race-neutral policies also were adopted later by the FCC to encourage
minority ownership. For example, previously the FCC required that a license applicant
have sufficient funds to construct and operate a station for one year. After the Minority
Ownership Task Force, which was convened by the FCC in 1977, indicated that this
requirement was a barrier to minority ownership, the obligation was reduced to three
months. See FCC Brief, supra note 22, at 45, n.46.
In 1979 the FCC disseminated a listing of minorities who were interested in purchas-
ing broadcasting facilities. Id. at 45, n.47. Finally, the FCC expanded the total number
of radio and television stations, thereby increasing opportunities for minorities to enter
the broadcast industry. Id. at 45, n.48.
35. This Current Topic argues that although the primary rationale for these policies
has been encouraging diverse viewpoints over the public airwaves, a secondary rationale
has been to remedy past discrimination. This interpretation reflects the viewpoint in a
recent statement by the FCC itself: See FCC Brief supra note 22, at 32-33 (indicating that
minority preference policies in broadcasting are justifiably attributable to remedying
past societal discrimination).
36. See WINDOW DRESSING AND WINDOW DRESSING II supra note 9.
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to Window Dressing II, while 64.9% of the management positions at
forty selected television stations were held by white males, only
5.2% and 4.4% were held by African-American males and African-
American females respectively.3 7 The track record for station own-
ership by minorities was scarcely better. Although the first African-
American broadcaster was licensed in 1949,38 by 1971 only ten of
approximately 7,500 radio broadcast licenses were owned by minor-
ities.39 The court in Citizens Communications Center v. FCC noted that
new interest groups and minorities must be given broadcast oppor-
tunities and indicated that few stations were minority-owned. 40
C. Development of Minority Preference Policies
1. Qualitative enhancements in comparative hearings In TV 941 the
D.C. Circuit held that the FCC had erred by not giving proper con-
sideration to an applicant's minority ownership and participation. 42
The court reasoned that promoting minority ownership was consis-
tent with the FCC's primary objective of ensuring maximum diversi-
fication of ownership of mass communications media, and therefore
concluded that the reasonable expectation of diversity, and not ad-
vance demonstration, was adequate for a preference to be
awarded. 43 After TV9, the FCC began awarding a qualitative en-
hancement for minority ownership.44
Qualitative minority ownership enhancements are awarded dur-
ing the comparative hearing process 45 for a broadcast license only
after it is determined that the applicant is not entitled to a prefer-
ence under 47 U.S.C. 307(b)46 or has a clear quantitative advantage.
37. WINDow DRESSING II, supra note 9, at 87.
38. Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Association of Black Owned Broadcasters,
Inc. in support of Petitioner at 17 n.2, Astroline Communications Co. v. Shurberg
Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc., cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 715 (1990) (No. 89-700).
39. Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213, n.36.
40. Id.
41. TV 9, 495 F.2d at 936-37.
42. Id. at 937.
43. Id. at 937-38. The court reasoned that since there was no requirement for an
advance demonstration of the nexus of program diversity to be awarded for a local resi-
dence merit, neither should such proof be required for a minority ownership preference.
44. Garrett v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1975) reaffirmed TV9 and emphasized
that no advance demonstration of a nexus between minority ownership and program-
ming diversity was required.
45. The comparative hearing process seeks to achieve the dual objectives of ensur-
ing the best practicable service to the public and a maximum diversification of control.
See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394 (1965) (herein-
after 1965" Policy Statement].
46. An applicant who is entitled to a preference under 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) based on
her ability to provide first or second local service will prevail without a comparative
hearing. Section 307(b) of the Communications Act, Pub. L. No.97-259, 96 Stat. 1093
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Two quantitative factors are considered: (1) the applicant's owner-
ship interest in other broadcasting mass media47 and (2) the appli-
cant's integration of ownership and management. 48 If there is no
clear quantitative advantage, the candidates are evaluated based on
a series of qualitative factors such as: local residence, civic participa-
tion, past broadcast experience, and minority and female owner-
ship.49 Therefore, in order for minority ownership to be considered
in the process at least two conditions must be met: (1) there is no
§ 307(b) preference and (2) there is no quantitative advantage.
2. Minority preferences for tax certificates and distress sales By 1978,
it was apparent that neither the FCC's policies nor the marketplace
were significantly increasing minority ownership. Less than 1 7 of
all broadcast stations, or fewer than 85, were owned by minorities.50
In April 1977, the FCC held a conference to analyze the reasons for
the continued underrepresentation of minority broadcasting own-
ers.5' Participants complained that years of racial discrimination
created barriers that prevented minorities from becoming broad-
casters. Purchasing a broadcast license was difficult for minorities
since they were outside of the "Old Boy Network" and often did not
receive information about potential station sales;5 2 they also lacked
capital, and could not easily obtain financing.53 Challenging a li-
cense during a renewal was difficult because of the cost, length, and
uncertainty of the process. 54
(1982) (codified at 47 U.S.C., § 307(b)) requires the Commission "to provide a fair,
efficient, and equitable distribution" of broadcast service among states and communi-
ties. See Winter Park, 873 F.2d at 349.
47. Credit is given to the applicant with no other mass media ownership interest. See
Brief for Respondent Intervenor Rainbow Broadcasting Company at 2, Metro Broad-
casting, Inc. v. FCC, cert. granted, 110 S.Ct. 715 (1990) (No. 89-453).
48. Credit is given based on the percentage of ownership that will work full-time at
the station, with the amount of credit given influenced by the policy-making and man-
agement level of the jobs. Id. at 2-3.
49. FCC Brief, supra note 22, at 3.
50. Minority Ownership Policy Statement, supra, note 11, at 1.
51. The conference was held on April 25-26. 1977, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COM-
MISSION, MINORITY OWNERSHIP TASK FORCE, REPORT ON MINORITY OWNERSHIP IN
BROADCASTING (1978) [hereinafter MINORITv BROADCASTING OWNERSHIP REPORT].
52. Id. at 9. One problem was that most stations were sold by brokers unaccustomed
to dealing with minority clients, who were outside of the "old boy network".
53. Id. at 14. Commercial banks were reluctant to finance broadcasting facilities
which were risky, particularly since the license, often the most valuable aspect of the
property, was subject to renewal. Because minorities generally had no prior experience
in the broadcasting business, banks were all the more reluctant to lend.
54. Id. at 10. Recently the FCC estimated that completion of the hearing process can
take as long as 3-5 years. See The Commission's Rules to Allow the Selection from
Among Competing Applicants for New AM, FM, and Television Stations by Random
Selection (Lottery) 4 F.C.C. Rec'd 2256, 2257 (March 10, 1989) [hereinafter Lottery
Statement]. One of the interviewees indicated that she had spent over $500,000 in legal
388
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A week after the conference issued its report, the FCC announced
two new policies: minority preferences for tax certificates and in dis-
tress sales. In 1978, the FCC announced that tax certificates, which
allow licensees to defer the capital gains tax on sales, would be
awarded to transferors who sold their licenses to groups with minor-
ity ownership.5 5 Because prices of broadcast facilities are escalating,
a tax certificate is an extremely persuasive incentive since it can re-
sult in millions of dollars in deferred tax liability. The distress sale
policy allowed a broadcaster whose license has been designated for
a revocation hearing or whose renewal application has been desig-
nated for hearing on basic qualification issues to assign or transfer
her license to a minority ownership group at a "distress sale"
price.56
Since the licensee, barring the minority preference, would not
normally be able to sell,5 7 the program was beneficial to the seller
since she could receive capital, avoid an expensive revocation hear-
ing, and eliminate the stigma of a revoked license. The purchaser
received the advantage of purchasing the station at a discount.
However, the impact of the distress sale policy was rendered moot
by deregulation 58 and the Shurberg decision. 59
fees while engaged in comparative hearings. Telephone interview with Barbara Lamont,
see infra Appendix A. Participants also complained about the lack of available high
quality unused frequencies and discrimination by advertisers and rating services which
impacted the ability of Black-formatted stations to generate revenue. MiNoIrr BROAD-
CASTING OWNERSHIP REPORT, supra note 51, at 10, 23-27.
55. Based on Section 1071 of Internal Revenue Code, the FCC has the authority to
issue certificates which allow licensees to defer the capital gains tax on sales when neces-
sary to adopt a new policy or effectuate a policy change. Minority Ownership Policy
Statement, supra note 1I, at 983. Although originally the group had to have at least 50%
minority ownership, after 1982, only 20% minority-ownership was required. Id. at n.20.
See In re Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in
Broadcasting, 92 F.C.C.2d 849 (1982).
56. Minority Ownership Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 983.
57. Id. Prior to the implementation of the minority preference policies, generally a
broadcaster whose license was subject to revocation was not permitted to sell, except
under extraordinary circumstances such as in the event of bankruptcy or when the seller
was physically or mentally disabled.
58. Since the substantial deregulation of the broadcasting industry began in 1981,
there has been a significant decline in distress sales. Between 1978 and 1982, there were
twenty-six distress sales. However, since 1982, there have been only ten. CONSUMER
ASSISTANCE AND SMALL BUSINESS DIVISION, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, FEDERAL COMMU-
NICATIONS COMMISSION, MINORITY OWNERSHIP LISTS (1988). [hereinafter MINORITY
OWNERSHIP LISTS]. There have been no minority preferences in distress sales since
Shurberg; see Porter Testimony, supra note 12, at summary.
59. See Shurberg, supra note 13.
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II. Methodology
When preference programs are evaluated, a critical issue is
whether the remedial policy addresses instances of specific racial
discrimination. 60 Similarly, when the FCC's minority preference
policies have been reviewed by the courts, questions about the pres-
ence of racial discrimination arise.6' The primary source of evidence
of racial discrimination in the broadcasting industry -to date has
been through legislative histories and congressional hearings.62
A. Sample Group
To help clarify whether there is racial discrimination in the broad-
casting industry, I surveyed twenty African-American broadcasters
who collectively own 54 radio stations, or approximately 30% of
those owned by African-Americans in the United States.63 These
station owners were selected randomly but with the objective of ob-
taining responses from different geographic areas and from owners
with different levels of experience. While the stations were located
in a variety of geographic areas ranging from a small predomi-
nantely African-American southern town (Tuskegee, Alabama) to
New York City, the greatest concentration of the stations was in the
60. See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 478 (indicating that while Congress did not include
preambulatory findings in its legislation to provide that grantees of the Local Public
Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976 must set aside 107o of funds
for minority enterprises, Congress had historical basis to conclude that remedial action
was warranted); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (indicating that societal discrimination alone is
not sufficient to justify a racial classification); and Croson, 109 S.Ct. at 714 (stating that
the city had failed to show any probative evidence of discrimination in the local con-
struction industry).
61. See, e.g., Shurberg, 876 F.2d at 913-914 (indicating that the FCC seems to justify
the distress sale minority preference both as a means to diversify programming and to
remedy past discrimination, but faulting both Congress and the FCC for failing to pro-
vide any evidence to link minority underrepresentation with specific discriminatory prac-
tices in the broadcasting industry); and Winter Park, 873 F.2d at 353 (affirming the
District Court of Western Michigan's finding that Congress had determined that minor-
ity underrepresentation was the result of prior racial and ethnic discrimination).
62. See, e.g., Winter Park, 873 F.2d at 353 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-765, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1982)) as providing the evidence for Congress' assertion that there
is minority underrepresentation in the broadcasting industry) and Brief for Respondent
Intervenor Rainbow Broadcasting Company, supra note 47, at 14 (indicating that for
nearly a decade Congress has held numerous hearings regarding the lack of minority
broadcasters).
63. See Appendix A for the list of broadcasters surveyed. It is difficult to determine
the exact number of African-American-owned stations. The last comprehensive study
conducted by the National Association of Broadcasters in 1986 indicated that there were
150. See NAB FAc-rs, supra note 22, at 8. The latest membership list of NABOB indi-
cated that there were 184 African-American owned stations. NABOB, membership list
(Apr. 6, 1990) (unpublished).
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South.6 4 Twenty-five percent of the broadcasters were women.65
Although there is no scientific basis to conclude that the sample
group is typical of the average African-American broadcaster, it is
representative of a broad cross-section, and reveals many character-
istics that contradict the negative media images of African-American
entrepreneurs who seek to enter the broadcasting industry.66
1. Prior broadcasting experience Contrary to the image of an in-
experienced applicant, 50% of the sample group had prior broad-
casting experience before they purchased their first station.
Twenty-five percent had more than fifteen years of experience when
they purchased their first station.67 Five owners had been general
managers of stations before acquiring their broadcast facility.68
Fifty percent of those acquiring broadcasting experience worked
either for a Black-formatted or African-American-owned station.69
Given figures indicating that African-Americans only occupy be-
tween 3%o-6%o of the upper job classifications in the broadcasting
industry,70 it appears that mainstream broadcasting facilities may
not be creating adequate opportunities for minorities to acquire ex-
perience.7 1 One broadcaster, who gained her initial experience in
mainstream facilities indicated that she later took a job offer in
64. See infia Appendix A (eighteen of the 54 radio stations surveyed were in the
South).
65. Id. (telephone interviews).
66. See Kinsley, Invidious Distinction, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 5, 1990, at 4 (indicating that
the people taking advantage of the minority preference rules are "those who are already
well-to-do, and those who are simply fronting for white businessmen").
67. These broadcasters reported a variety of experiences. Howard Sanders, who
had approximately twenty-five years of experience in the broadcasting industry, had
worked as a reporter, hosted a television show, owned and operated an advertising
agency and managed WYCB-AM in Washington, D.C. that he now owns. Telephone
interview with Howard Sanders, see infra Appendix A. Paul Major had worked for seven-
teen years both in television and radio before acquiring WTMP-AM in Tampa, Florida.
Telephone interview with Paul Major, see infra Appendix A. Charles Sherrell had fifteen
years of broadcasting experience and was the general manager of WBEE-AM in Chicago
when he purchased it. Telephone interview with Charles Sherrell, see infra Appendix A.
William Shearer had twenty years of broadcasting experience and Skip Finley nineteen
years, when they bought their first stations. Telephone interviews with William Shearer
and Skip Finley, see infra Appendix A.
68. These were Cathy Hughes, Howard Sanders, William Shearer, Charles Sherrell,
and Mutter Evans. Telephone interviews, see infra Appendix A.
69. William Shearer, Cathy Hughes, Charles Sherrell, Mutter Evans, and Glenn
Mahone had experience with Black-formatted or African-American-owned stations
before acquiring their stations. Telephone interviews, see infra Appendix A.
70. See infra note 120.
71. See Presentation of A. Pharr, supra note 19 at 3. Other reports also have indi-
cated that employment opportunities for minorities are either stagnating or declining.
See, Payne, In TVNews, a Trend Back to Lily-White, Newsday, Sept. 18, 1988 at 9 (quoting a
study by Vernon Stone, Director of Research Services for the Radio-Television News
Directors Association which indicated that minority representation in broadcast news
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Nigeria because she was unable to gain comparable managerial ex-
perience in the United States. 72 Another credited earlier FCC poli-
cies with influencing broadcasters to create employment
opportunities for minorities that indirectly helped him to get a job
with a television station.73 However, another broadcaster, who tried
to get a job as a newscaster, prior to the implementation of the
FCC's EEO policies, was denied the opportunity to be interviewed
when he showed up for an appointment, although he had studied at
New York University's School of Radio and Television. 74
The women broadcasters who were interviewed also had broad-
casting experience prior to the time they acquired their first sta-
tions. Cathy Hughes had seven years experience and had been the
general manager of two radio stations before she purchased her first
station.75 Mutter Evans had worked in news, sales, public affairs, and
finally as a general manager, before purchasing the station of her
former employer. 76 Barbara Lamont had approximately 31 years of
various experience in broadcasting, including reporting as well as
managing, before she purchased a television station.77 Another
broadcaster decided to pursue acquiring her own station after a
group interested in obtaining a license asked her to participate; but
then called the deal off when she demanded that she actually be
given some responsibility once the station was acquired.78
2. Multiple ownership Most of the broadcasters owned more
than one station, with the average being 2.9. 79 Based on data from
the National Association of Broadcasters and NABOB this charac-
teristic may be atypical. Those surveys indicate that the average Af-
rican-American broadcaster owned a single station.8 0
3. AM-FM ownership Twenty-eight of the stations owned
were AM and 26 were FM. This represents a higher ownership of
FM stations proportionately than the general population of African-
was about the same in 1987 as in 1972 and that African-Americans held only about .3
percent of news directors jobs).
72. Profile: Barbara Lamont-Making Impossible Dreams Come True, AFRICA MONTHLY,
Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 10.
73. Telephone interview with Skip Finley, see infra Appendix A.
74. Telephone interview with Andrew Langston, see infra Appendix A.
75. Telephone interview with Cathy Hughes, see infra Appendix A.
76. Telephone interview with Mutter Evans, see infra Appendix A.
77. Telephone interview with Barbara Lamont, see infra Appendix A.
78. Telephone interview with Nancy Waters, see infra Appendix A.
79. These figures include the four then being negotiated for by Ragan Henry. Tele-
phone interview, see infra Appendix A.
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American broadcasters. For example, in the latest listing of NABOB
members, 112 of the 184 stations owned were AMs; and the last
NAB survey reported that 94 of the 150 African-American owned
stations were AM.81
4. Length of time in business The average time the surveyed
owner had been in broadcasting was approximately thirteen years.
Seven had sold a station within the past three years.8 2 Five had sold
some stations to minorities.83 Ten of the sixteen broadcasters who
answered this question entered the broadcasting industry between
1971 and 1980. Only one of the broadcasters who was interviewed
was in business before 1972.84
5. Ownership structure Most of the broadcasters used a corpo-
rate structure. Two indicated that they were 100%o owners.8  Of the
eleven broadcasters who responded to questions about their specific
percentage of ownership, six indicated that their businesses were
100% minority owned.8 6 One indicated that his business was 95%
minority owned.87 Five broadcasters indicated that they owned be-
tween 51%o'-55% of their corporations.88 Three owned between 9%-
38%. s9 One broadcaster owned 67% of a limited partnership. 90
B. Methodology
Broadcasters were asked to identify examples of discrimination
that they experienced in acquiring and operating their stations.
81. See NABOB membership list, supra note 63 passim and NAB FACTS, supra note 22
at 8, 15-35.
82. The following broadcasters indicated that they had sold stations during the past
three years: Pierre Sutton (3), Howard Sanders (2), Ragan Henry (10-11), Ronald Dav-
enport (1), Robert Lee (7), Jim Hutchinson (2), and Willie Davis (2). Telephone inter-
views, see infra Appendix A.
83. The following broadcasters indicated that they had sold stations to minorities
during the past three years: Pierre Sutton (2), Howard Sanders (2), Ragan Henry (4) and
Ronald Davenport (1).
84' Mildred Carter's family has owned one of its stations since 1950. Telephone
interview, see infra Appendix A.
85. Mildred Carter and Ronald Davenport indicated that their families were 100%
owners of their broadcasting corporations. Telephone interviews, see infra Appendix A.
86. Charles Sherrell, William Shearer, Howard Sanders, George Clay, Andrew Lang-
ston, Jim Hutchinson, Ronald Davenport, and Mildred Carter indicated that their busi-
ness are 100% minority owned. Telephone interviews, see infra Appendix A.
87. Telephone interview with Pierre Sutton, see infra Appendix A.
88. Charles Sherrell, William Shearer, Howard Sanders, George Clay, Glenn
Mahone, and Robert Lee owned between 51-54%. Telephone interviews, see infa Ap-
pendix A.
89. Pierre Sutton, Jim Hutchinson, and Paul Major owned between 9-38% of their
corporations. Telephone interviews, see infra Appendix A.
90. Telephone interview with Ragan Henry, see infra Appendix A.
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They also were asked to identify obstacles they felt characterized the
experiences of minorities in the broadcasting industry. Other pro-
fessionals knowledgeable about broadcasting, such as advertisers,
brokers, rating service executives, representatives of trade organiza-
tions and representatives of the FCC were also consulted to help
evaluate whether these obstacles were the result of racial
discrimination. 9 1
Ilf. Obstacles to Minority Station Acquisition
A. Lack of Access to High Quality Stations
Licenses to many of the highest quality stations were issued dur-
ing the formative years of the regulated broadcasting industry.
Since African-Americans were subjected to severe societal and state-
sanctioned racial discrimination, however, they were not able to take
advantage of these opportunities. 92 In the South, where most Afri-
can-Americans lived prior to World War II, laws which mandated
social and economic segregation of the races were generally not
overturned until the civil rights struggles of the 1960s and 1970s.93
Since racial discrimination meant that African-Americans were often
91. Among the professionals with whom I consulted and/or interviewed were: John
Oxendine, President, and Kenneth Harris, Executive Vice-President, BROADCAP;
Dwight Ellis, Vice-President of Minority and Special Services, National Association of
Broadcasters; Pluria Marshall, National Black Media Coalition; Daniel Jaffe, Executive
Vice-President, National Association of Advertisers;James Winston, Executive Director,
National Association of Black-Owned Broadcasters; Rhody Bosley, Vice-President, Sales
and Marketing, Radio Station Services, Arbitron; Caroline Jones, Caroline R.Jones Ad-
vertising; John Camp, Vice-President, American Association of Advertising Agencies;
and Jim Blackburn, Chairman, Blackburn and Company Incorporated.
92. FCC Brief, supra note 22, at 32-33. The FCC indicates that stations using fre-
quencies with the widest coverage and in the largest communities were issued during
these earlier years.
93. Although Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), invalidated the "sepa-
rate but equal" doctrine of Plssy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (which had given judi-
cial sanction to legalized racial segregation), it was only after the massive civil rights
demonstrations in the 1960s and 1970s that change occurred. See KERNER REPORT, supra
note 5, at 100, 107 (describing the development of legalized segregation in the South
particularly after Plessy, and similar discrimination, whether by law or custom, in the
North; and describing the impact of the Montgomery bus boycott and the student sit-ins
of the 1960s).
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denied access to quality education,94 relegated to unskilled or unde-
sirable employment, and restricted from participating in the main-
stream,95 they often lacked capital as well as business experience at
the time when broadcasting licenses were being awarded, particu-
larly from 1934-1970. 96 However, even the few African-Americans
who were in a position to apply for broadcasting licenses in these
early years often were discouraged or denied the opportunity to do
so. As Percy Sutton, Chairman of Inner City Broadcasting, Inc. re-
cently testified:
... when my family sought to buy a radio station in the year 1942, in
San Antonio, Texas, nobody would sell them a radio station. There
was a building, in San Antonio, Texas, that we owned, that we could
not even collect rent from. We had to have a white person collect the
rent.
9 7
Similar obstacles were reported by the late Dr. Haley Bell, who
purchased a radio station in Detroit in the early 1950s, and indi-
cated that he had tried to buy a radio station for more than 25 years
before his successful purchase.98
As a result of racial discrimination, when African-Americans be-
gan to enter the broadcasting industry as license applicants, there
were few high quality stations available. While reliable statistics are
not available, it has been reported that until 1949 there was not a
single African-American owned radio station, and neither were
there more than four or five owned in the 1950s. 99 One of the great-
est spurts of ownership prior to the implementation of the FCC's
policies seems to have occurred in 1972 when, according to research
conducted by R.D. Bachman, ten stations were acquired by African-
Americans, increasing their total ownership to twenty stations.' 00
However, by mid-1973, 85% of authorized AM stations - those
most accessible to African-Americans - were allocated, as well as
94. KERNER REPORT, supra note 5, at 106 ("The South reacted to the Supreme
Court's decision on school desegregation by attempting to outlaw the NAACP, intimi-
dating civil rights leaders, calling for 'massive resistance' to the Court's decision, cur-
tailing Negro voter registration and forming White Citizens' Councils").
95. Id. at 108 ("A major factor intensifying the civil rights movement was widespread
Negro unemployment and poverty...").
96. In 1975 approximately three percent of all businesses in the United States were
owned by minorities and 0.65% of the gross receipts realized by businesses were real-
ized by minority businesses. H.R. Rep. No. 468, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1975), quoted
in Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 465.
97. 1989 Hearing on Minority Ownership 16 (testimony of Percy Sutton), quoted in FCC
Brief, supra note 22, at 33.
98. R. D. Bachman, Dynamics of Black Radio: A Research Report 18 (1977) (unpub-
lished paper available in NAB Library).
99. Id. at 16.
100. Id. at 17.
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68.5% of FM stations.' 0 ' The policy of the FCC is to renew licenses
where there is "meritorious service." Because few minorities owned
stations, the unintentional result of the FCC's policy which pre-
ferred incumbent owners was "inhibiting the opportunities for mi-
norities to own those desirable broadcast stations that were initially
licensed during the period when minorities did not participate in the
industry either as owners or employees".' 0 2
The impact of the expanding FM station market and price infla-
tion on African-Americans who entered the broadcasting industry in
the 1970s had two general results. First, African-Americans tended
to purchase AM stations, often of low power, as owners moved to
the newly expanding, more expensive FM stations, which had the
capability of broadcasting in stereo. A survey conducted in 1974 by
the Radio Department of Howard University of twenty-nine African-
American-owned radio stations found that 89% were daytime AM
stations (i.e., stations whose licenses only allowed them to broadcast
from sunrise to sunset) and 50% of the stations were of one kilowatt
or less. ' 0 3 Therefore, ironically, at the same time FM radio was be-
coming an important force in the market, African-Americans were
concentrating their purchases in the AM market. ' 04 Second, many of
the stations were selling at inflated prices. In contrast, during the
formative years of the broadcasting industry, many stations were ob-
tained at comparatively modest costs. 105 Low-power stations were
later sold to African-Americans for ten to fifteen times the cost of
the original investment. 106
Today, although there is more diversification in station ownership
among African-Americans, the majority of African-American owned
stations still are AM and often "small properties, outside large pop-
ulation centers and mainstream advertising demand."' t0 7 Changes in
the market for broadcasting properties have caused more frequent
combination sales (package deals involving several stations), and
101. See Minority Broadcast Ownership: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications,
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (1989) (statement of John Payton)
[hereinafter Payton testimony]. Similarly, 66.67 of all commercial television stations
and 91.4% of UHF stations had been allocated byJune, 1973. Id.
102. FCC Brief, supra note 22, at 33.
103. Bachman, supra note 98, at 29.
104. Gross revenues of FM stations increased from $19.7 million to $224 million
between 1964 and 1974. Id. at 29.
105. FCC Brief, supra note 22, at 33.
106. See Bachman, supra note 98 (indicating that owners realizing the great desire of
African-Americans to purchase stations and the scarcity of available facilities often in-
flated their prices).
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have thus increased the price of desirable properties. Therefore,
many minorities can only afford to buy AM properties. 08 As Jim
Hutchinson, a multiple station owner, described the change in the
industry:
The whole ballgame has escalated. Properties are harder to get; fi-
nancing is harder to get; deregulation; the anti-trafficking rule suspen-
sion; the number of stations one owner can own; the widespread use
of syndications and limited partnerships to buy; the involvement of
Wall Street in transactions. There has been a total change in the
industry. 10 9
Although there are a handful of African-American broadcasters
who, because of their track record with multiple station ownership
and their alliances with institutional investors, have access to a mul-
titude of high quality stations, their experience may not be typical of
other African-American broadcasters." l0 Some of the other broad-
casters interviewed felt that another obstacle which continued to
face many minority broadcasters was an inability to receive informa-
tion about quality station sales since they remained outside of the
"old boy network.""' Many stations, when resold, are sold through
brokers. However, broadcasters complain that brokers do not in-
form the general public about broadcast opportunities, but favor
prior clients. 12 While it is understandable that a seller may not want
it to be known that her station is available for sale because of the
potential negative impact on her station personnel, newly entering
broadcasters or those without established contacts may not learn
about deals until after they have occurred."13 Lack of information
and the shortage of available stations may cause broadcasters to ac-
cept deals that are not very favorable, just to have the opportunity to
enter the business. Mutter Evans, after explaining the tremendous
108. Telephone interview with John Oxendine and Kenneth Harris (Apr. 20, 1989).
109. Telephone interview with Jim Hutchinson, see infra Appendix A.
110. For example, Don Cornwell, President and Chief Executive Officer of Granite
Broadcasting, indicated that brokers frequently call him about available television sta-
tions. Telephone interview with Don Cornwell (Mar. 28, 1990).
111. Telephone interview with William Shearer, see infra Appendix A ("There is an
old boy network. They (sellers] would rather sell to a large network or someone they
know. We have seen this many times. Major FM stations normally go to big
corporations").
112. Telephone interview with Glenn Mahone, see infra Appendix A (explaining that
many deals are never even made available to minority broadcasters). Ironically, similar
complaints were voiced by minority broadcasters twelve years ago. See MINORrr BROAD-
CASTING OWNERSHIP REPORT, supra note 51, at 9.
113. Telephone interview with Andrew Langston, see infra Appendix A (complaining
that minorities never find out about sales until it's too late; and suggesting that the FCC
provide more information).
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difficulty she had in financing her station, which caused her to ac-
cept costly financing, summed up the feeling of frustration by say-
ing: "You've got to belong to the network in order to be able to buy
something that has a fighting chance. My deal was less than desira-
ble, but I couldn't have gotten in the door otherwise." 1 4 An earlier
analysis of minority ownership confirmed the difficulty about getting
information regarding station sales:
Information about stations for sale is not widely circulated. The most
fruitful source of such information is the group of firms and individu-
als that acts as station brokers. Between one-third and one-half of all
stations sold are never listed with brokers, however. These stations
are purchased as the result of contacts directly between buyers and
sellers or through information passed on by communications lawyers,
national representative firms, other station owners and similarly estab-
lished members of the broadcasting community. In practical terms
these stations are available only to active members of that
community. 1"5
B. Difficulty in Obtaining Financing
The greatest problem facing minority broadcasters, according to
my survey, is "getting financing and the lack of capital.' 16 Many of
the problems described echo the complaints voiced at the FCC's
1977 minority ownership conference."17
A principal barrier to minority ownership is the availability of funding
... Unfortunately, experience has shown that minorities face unusually
difficult problems in acquiring financing to purchase a broadcast sta-
tion .... Prospective minority licensees, in most instances, have limited
experience in managing broadcast properties and are regarded by finan-
cial institutions as relatively high risk borrowers. Additionally, many
lending institutions do not like to become involved.., when the prin-
cipal asset ... is a temporary license. 1" 8
What has changed since the FCC's conference is the nature of the
market and the amount of capital required to enter the broadcasting
industry. Today, station purchases are often millions of dollars, and
to get a competitive price, a buyer may need to be able to afford a
114. Telephone interview with Mutter Evans, see infra Appendix A.
115. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIOM, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, EEO MI-
NORITY ENTERPRISE DIVISION, MINORITY OWNERSHIP OF BROADCAST FACILITIES: A RE-
PORT 15 (1979)(hereinafter MINoRrrY OWNERSHIP OF BROADCAST FACILITIES]. All but
one of the three interviewees felt that obtaining financing and the lack of available capi-
tal were the greatest problems facing minority broadcasters. Telephone interviews, see
infra Appendix A.
116. Telephone interviews, see infra Appendix A.
117. MINORITY BROADCASTING OWNERSHIP REPORT, supra note 51, at 11.
118. Id. at 11-12.
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package deal (i.e., the simultaneous purchase of more than one
broadcasting facility).'19
Although the requirement that a potential borrower have prior
broadcasting experience or equity is not restricted to African-Amer-
icans, past racial discrimination makes it more difficult for them to
meet these demands. Employment discrimination in the broadcast-
ing industry means that there will not be a large pool of African-
Americans with relevant experience, especially in management.' 20
Also, because past discrimination inhibited the ability of African-
Americans to accumulate capital either through high paying jobs or
business ventures, they are less likely to have resources to provide
equity. As William Shearer, a Los Angeles station owner explained:
Some of the stations in my market now cost $55 million; which means
you have to have at least $5 million in equity. There aren't too many
of us with that in our checkbooks. This means you have to form
groups or syndications. We seem to have problems doing that.' 2 1
Established owners, as well as entering broadcasters, find it difficult
to meet the spiraling prices of radio stations. Willie Davis, a multi-
ple owner, explained that he decided to sell his AM station in Hous-
ton, bought with the expectation of pairing it with a particular FM,
because of rapidly escalating prices that caused the six million dollar
FM property to go up to thirteen million dollars within a few
years. 122
African-Americans, due to societal discrimination, may be per-
ceived as "high risk" borrowers in spite of past experience. Jim
Hutchinson, today a multiple station owner and at the time of his
entry a bank vice-president, was unable to get financing for his first
station except through an African-American owned bank.' 23 Charles
Sherrell, who had been for fifteen years the general manager of the
station which he later acquired, was turned down by three banks. In
the case of two banks, he felt the rejections were due to race since
their demands were overly stringent. He was able to get financing
from a venture capital company that had attended a NABOB confer-
ence. 124 Ragan Henry, a partner in a major Philadelphia law firm
119. Telephone interview with John Oxendine and Kenneth Harris, supra note 108.
120. A 1989 report found that African-Americans only occupied between 3-6% of
the upper job classifications in the broadcasting industry. See Presentation of A. Pharr,
supra note 19, at 3. Telephone interview with Skip Finley, see infra Appendix A (indicat-
ing the Catch-22 situation of many African-Americans: they need experience to get the
deal financed, but there are limited opportunities to get the experience).
121. Telephone interview with William Shearer, see infra Appendix A.
122. Telephone interview with Willie Davis, see infra Appendix A.
123. Telephone interview with Jim Hutchinson, see infra Appendix A.
124. Telephone interview with Charles Sherrell, see infra Appendix A.
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and now the largest African-American multiple station owner, had a
friend intercede when the bank threatened to withdraw on the eve
of the dosing of his first broadcast deal.' 25
C. Biases by Rating Services and Advertisers
A ripple effect of the difficulties in obtaining financing and high
quality stations is that African-American broadcast facilities are
often highly leveraged and have a greater dependency on advertis-
ing revenues to pay debt service.' 26 Advertisers can play a vital role
in impacting the financial success or failure of a station. 27 Many of
the interviewees felt that they were not able to generate their fair
share of advertising revenue because of racial discrimination that
impacted rating services, advertising agencies and advertisers.
1. Inaccurate ratings Ratings are of critical importance in at-
tracting advertising. 28 Since advertisers want their dollars to reach
a maximum number of people, they use ratings to estimate the per-
centage of households in a market listening to a station.12 9 An ad-
vertising agency will generally limit its purchases to the top two or
three rated stations in a market. Therefore, if a station is rated in-
correctly, this error can have a serious impact on its revenues.
There are two major ratings services, Arbitron and Birch.' 3 0 Arbi-
tron, is clearly the most widely used service.13 1 Arbitron however,
measures audience listenership primarily by having members of se-
lected households within a market record the stations they listen to
within a seven day period. 32
125. Telephone interview with Ragan Henry, see infra Appendix A.
126. Id.
127. MINORITY OWNERSHIP OF BROADCAST FACILITIES, supra note 115, at 19.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. Telephone interview with Rhody Bosley, Vice-President, Sales and Market-
ing, Radio Station Services, Arbitron (Apr. 4, 1990).
131. National Association of Broadcasters, RAMTF/Final Report (July 13, 1987) (in-
dicating that many advertising agencies would be reluctant to accept competitive rating
services since their computer software addresses only Arbitron information).
132. These formats are known as diaries. Households are selected based on a statis-
tical sample of all persons over twelve years old within a metropolitan market, which
roughly corresponds to a Standard Metroplitan Statistical Area (SMSA), chosen from a
sample frame containing listed and a somewhat smaller mix of unlisted telephones in an
area. Before diaries are mailed out, participants are asked by telephone if they will re-
spond. Respondents must fill out the diaries correctly and return them to Arbitron
within a specified period of time for their responses to be evaluated. Telephone inter-
view with Rhody Bosley, supra note 130.
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For many years minority broadcasters have complained that Arbi-
tron's methodology undercounts African-American listeners.13 3 The
Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities Report concluded that rat-
ing services were not accurately estimating minority listenership of
Black-formatted stations. Specifically, the Report found that the
services, which based their samples on the census, were not adjusted
to compensate for minority underrepresentation in the census.
Also, because the sample frame was telephone-based, some minori-
ties would be underrepresented since they had fewer telephones.13 4
Interviewees have complained that the methodology is flawed be-
cause African-Americans may be less likely to complete diaries; are
less likely to have listed telephones; are less likely to receive diaries;
and are more likely to have of their listenership impact diluted be-
cause a metropolitan market is used to evaluate rather than the city
itself(where African-Americans are likely to comprise a proportion-
ately greater portion of the population).' 3 5 Some interviewees have
found great discrepancies between their Arbitron ratings and their
Birch ratings.136 In one instance, Arbitron ranked a station numbers
eight through ten in appropriate categories, while Birch ranked the
station number one in the same categories. If an advertising agency
used the Arbitron rating, the station might lose sales. Other broad-
casters reported similar discrepancies. t'37
2. Inability to obtain advertising revenues proportionate to their audi-
ence share Black-formatted radio stations generally do not generate
advertising revenues which are commensurate with their audience
share.' 38 In a study conducted in 1988 of 809 radio stations which
compared twelve formats and their ability to generate advertising
revenues commensurate with their audience shares, Black-formatted
stations were the second least favorable category.'3 9 What this means,
133. See Bachman, supra note 98 at 38 (quoting Skip Finley who complained that,
although Sheridan Broadcasting's Boston station was the only Black-programmed sta-
tion in the area, Arbitron had indicated that only 300 males aged 25-49 listened to the
station, even though there were 40,000 African-American males in that category in the
area).
134. MINORITY OWNERSHIP oF BROADCAST FACILITIES, supra note 115, at 21.
135. Telephone interviews with Cathy Hughes, Andrew Langston, Jim Hutchinson
and Willie Davis, see infra Appendix A.
136. Telephone interview with Willie Davis, see infra Appendix A. Unlike Arbitron,
Birch uses a telephone retrieval method.
137. Telephone interview with Andrew Langston, see infra Appendix A.
138. SeeJ. DUNCAN, JR., THE RELATIONSHIP BETnWEEN RAnto AUDIENCE SHARES AND
REVENUE SHARES (1988).
139. Id. Black-formatted stations in 1987 had a mean coversion ratio of 70.7 as com-
pared with Hispanic-formatted stations with a mean conversion ratio of 110.1; Urban/
Hybrid-formatted stations with a conversion ratio of 91.6; and MOR/Full Service sta-
tions with a conversion ratio of 132.4.
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for example, is that if a Black-formatted station and a country-
formatted station have the same number of listeners according to a
rating service, the Black-formatted station can be expected to gener-
ate fewer advertising dollars. 140 Several interviewees expressed frus-
tration at the inability to generate advertising revenues
commensurate with their ratings. As Glenn Mahone explained:
Radio revenue is based on the market you can deliver. Your revenue is
based on the cost per point, which is 1% of the population. In Rich-
mond, advertisers typically pay $30 per point, but when they get to the
Black station, they pay $20-25 per point, regardless of the product.
O.K. if you're advertising a Mercedes we may not proportionately have
as many customers; but hamburgers?' 4 '
3. Reluctance to advertise on stations owned by African-Ameri-
cans Interviewees reported two types of discriminatory attitudes of
advertisers which affected their ability to generate advertising reve-
nue. The first was a reluctance of national companies to advertise
on Black-formatted stations even when the station was one of the
top-rated stations in the market.' 42 Broadcast owners attributed
this lack of responsiveness to discriminatory attitudes by national
companies, who assume that African-Americans do not consume
their products. As William Shearer explained when he was chair-
man of NABOB:
Advertisers don't seem to think that it is necessary to direct their ad-
vertising toward the Black market .... At NABOB we have made a
great effort.., to try to make the point that Blacks have and spend
money and that we buy toothpaste, soap, and mouthwash like every-
body else. Yet, usually it's the same companies which advertise on
Black radio ... and that's because of a top executive who is personally
committed. ' 43
However, advertising professionals claimed that the failure of na-
tional companies to advertise on Black-formatted radio is not the
result of intentional discrimination but rather is a market-driven
business decision. From their perspective, since companies want to
reach the largest possible market, they seek to advertise on general
market stations first and use stations with special formats only as
specific needs arise. 144 Whether a national company will include the
140. According to Duncan, a Black-formatted station would typically be expected to
convert about 70.7% of its audience share into advertising dollars, while a country-
formatted station could convert 11676. J. DUNCAN, supra note 138.
141. Telephone interview with Glenn Mahone, see infra Appendix A.
142. Telephone interview with James Winston, supra note 2.
143. Telephone interview with William Shearer, see infra Appendix A.
144. Telephone interview with John Camp, Vice-President, American Association of
Advertising Agencies (Apr. 6, 1990).
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African-American market specifically within its general marketing
campaign may depend on whether there is an advocate within the
company or advertising agency who will suggest that African-Ameri-
cans be included. 145 Advertising professionals indicated that sales
decisions are a question of "dollars and cents" and since computer
programs often are used to select where advertisements will be
placed, frequently the race of the station owners is not known. 146
Both advertisers and broadcasters agree, though, that a minuscule
percentage of national advertising dollars is targeted toward Black-
formatted radio. As Waynett A. Sobers, Jr., then Executive Vice-
President of Earl G. Graves, Ltd. testified:
The Black consumer market is valued at over $200 billion annually...
the total national expenditure for advertising in 1984 was approxi-
mately $88 billion [of which] $6 billion [was] for radio [advertising] ...
[however,] an estimated $52 million [was spent] in advertising revenue
for Black-owned radio stations or less than 1% of total U.S. radio ad-
vertising revenues. 147
Today the situation has not changed much and an extremely small
portion of national advertising dollars is devoted to the African-
American market. Caroline Jones, who heads one of the leading Af-
rican-American owned advertising agencies, explained:
It's not unusual for a company that is spending millions of dollars na-
tionally to come to us with $250,000 and say: 'Here, give us a national
Black-targeted advertising campaign which will track sales in six days.'
It puts us under tremendous pressure since we are limited by our
budget to place ads only in selected markets.' 48
African-Americans broadcasters argue that the placement of ad-
vertisements is not always a "color blind" process. Local compa-
nies, they contend, do know the race of the owner, and may refuse
to advertise on the station, even when a large part of their clientele
is African-American. An owner of radio stations in a predominately
African-American southern city complained that during his fifteen
years of operation, the local supermarket chain had spent no more
145. Telephone interview with Caroline Jones, Caroline R. Jones Advertising (Apr.
4, 1990).
146. Telephone interview with John Camp, supra note 144.
147. Minority Owned Broadcast Stations The Advertising Revenue Crisis: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 3-4 (1986) (statement of Waynett A. Sobers, Jr.).
148. Telephone interview with Caroline Jones, supra note 145. "To track sales"
means that a client expects to see a discernible increase in sales of its product to the
targeted group.
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than $1,000 in advertising with his stations, despite numerous at-
tempts to solicit ads, although the vast majority of the market's cus-
tomers are African-American.1 49 Mutter Evans, who bought the
Black-formatted radio station where she used to work, reported that
some clients cancelled their advertising as soon as her ownership
was announced.' 50 One of the most telling incidents was described
by Cathy Hughes, who owns a radio station in Washington, D.C.,
which has a large African-American population:
There is a major drug store chain here in town which has never given
us any business. When my son called, he was given an appointment to
make a marketing presentation. However, when he arrived, he was
forced to give the presentation in the lobby.' 5 '
One African-American broadcaster, who asked not to be identified,
indicated that after he purchased a top-rated radio station in a major
metropolitan market, some advertisers discontinued their accounts
when it became known that he was the new owner of the station.
However, multiple owners of highly rated stations that are not
Black-formatted, reported they were unaware of any discrimination
by local advertisers.1 52
IV. Is There a Nexus Between Minority Ownership
and Programming Diversity?
When people evaluate the nexus between minority ownership and
programming diversity they frequently assume that diverse pro-
gramming is synonymous with Black or urban formatting. 53 While
certainly the format of a station is a factor when evaluating its pro-
gramming diversity, strictly equating diversity with Black-formatting
is too narrow. This Current Topic argues that since the objective of
the diversification doctrine is to ensure representation of diverse
viewpoints, 54 other factors besides format must also be considered.
These factors include: the commitment of the station to provide
public service announcements or information pertinent to minority
viewpoints; the hiring of minorities, who are assumed to be more
sensitive to African-American needs; and the presenting of minority
149. Telephone interview with George Clay, see infra Appendix A.
150. Telephone interview with Mutter Evans, see infra Appendix A.
151. Telephone interview with Cathy Hughes, see infra Appendix A.
152. Telephone interview with Ragan Henry, see infra Appendix A.
153. See Bronner, Court Hears Challenge to FCC's Minority Preference, Boston Globe,
Mar. 29, 1990 at 3, col. 1. (where Justice Scalia objected to "skin color as a guide to
taste").
154. See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20. (First Amendment rests on assumption that
the dissemination of diverse viewpoints is essential to the public welfare).
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viewpoints.' 55 This Current Topic therefore considers these other
factors when analyzing programming diversity.
A. Black-formatting
Fifty percent of the stations in the survey were characterized by
their owners as being Black or urban-formatted.156 This compares
unfavorably with a finding of a recent report of the Congressional
Research Service that analyzed data from approximately 79% of all
broadcasting stations in 1988, and found that 65% of all radio sta-
tions with at least one African-American owner targeted their pro-
gramming to African-American audiences.1 57 The last survey of
minority owners conducted by NAB found that 45% of African-
American stations were Black or urban-formatted.15 8
However, both my survey and the NAB analysis indicate that it is a
fallacy to strictly equate Black or urban formatting with program-
ming targeted to African-American audiences. For example,
although some of the broadcasters were clearly targeting their pro-
gramming toward African-American audiences or expected to draw
a high percentage of African-American listeners, they chose not to
categorize themselves as Black or urban-formatted. One owner,
whose station's call letters were derived from the initials of African-
American leaders, described his station as "mass market with a
Black base."' 59 Another broadcaster, whose two stations were estab-
lished to fill a void for African-American listeners in the general
Kansas City market, described her facilities as "general market with
Black news."' 160 Some African-American broadcasters may not want
to characterize their stations as Black or urban-formatted because
they feel station formats make it more difficult to attract advertising
revenue than general market or "disco" stations, which nonetheless
may be targeted towards African-American audiences. 16' This
avoidance of a Black-format label is understandable since analyses
indicate that urban, news, or general market stations are much more
155. See KERNER REPORT, supra note 5, at 211 (indicating that the media must employ
more African-Americans to have a better link with their ideas).
156. Telephone interviews, see infra Appendix A.
157. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MINORITY BROADCAST STATION OWNERSHIP
AND BROADCAST PROGRAMMING: Is THERE A NExus, at Appendix (1988). The study
found that the greater the African-American ownership, the more likely the program-
ming will be targeted towards an African-American audience.
158. NAB FACTS, supra note 22, at 12.
159. Telephone interview with Andrew Langston, see infra Appendix A.
160. Telephone interview with Mildred Carter, see infra Appendix A.
161. See generally S. Finley, Statement before the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (Apr. 1977).
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likely to earn proportionately greater advertising revenues when
compared to audiences shares. 62 When my survey results are ad-
justed to include other categories that might be expected to be
targeted toward African-American audiences (such as gospel and
jazz), 61% of the stations were African-American targeted.' 63 Simi-
larly when the NAB analysis is adjusted to include other African-
American targeted categories (i.e. black contemporary, rhythm and
blues, black/Jazz, etc.), the percentage increases to 68%. 164
Another important question that needs to be answered in order to
evaluate the impact of minority ownership is whether it results in
any qualitative content differences in Black-formatting. Historically,
Black-formatted radio was controlled by white owners. The first
Black-formatted radio Station, WDIA in Memphis, Tennessee in
1947, was an instant financial success and by 1977, there were ap-
proximately 108 Black-formatted stations.1 65 However, these sta-
tions were often criticized for their lack of news coverage and their
failure to serve "the needs of the black community."' 6 6 A study con-
ducted by James Philip Jeter found that while African-American-
owned stations diversified their music selections more than White-
owned Black-formatted stations, there was not a significant differ-
ence quantitatively in the amount of time devoted to news and pub-
lic service announcements. 16 7 Jeter, however, cautioned that a truly
representative analysis must include a qualitative component, since
comparing minutes devoted to categories of programming may not
reveal differences in the programming.' 68 A later study by Marilyn
Diane Fife, an assistant professor at Temple University, confirmed
the importance of qualitative analysis.' 69 Although Dr. Fife's com-
parison of the news coverage of a White-owned and African-Ameri-
can-owned television station (WGPR) in the same market did not
reveal significant differences in the time allocated to various news
topics, except that the African-American owned station did not
devote as much coverage to crime, there was a significant difference
162. SeeJ. DUNCAN, JR., supra note 138 and accompanying text.
163. This represents about 32 of the 54 stations.
164. NAB FACTs, supra note 22, at 12.
165. Bachman, supra note 98 at 13, 57.
166. Id. at 58.
167. J. Jeter, A Comparative Analysis of the Programming Practice of Black-owned
Black-oriented Radio Stations and White-owned, Black-oriented Radio Stations, (1981)
(Ph.d. dissertation, University of Wisconsin).
168. Id. at 145.
169. M. Fife, The Impact of Minority Ownership on Broadcast Program Content: A
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in the content of the topics covered. WGPR used a greater number
of African-Americans in newsmaker roles and there was a higher
coverage of issues with racial significance.' 70
B. Policies Encouraging Diverse Viewpoints
My survey revealed that many of the broadcasters tried to benefit
the African-American community by including public service infor-
mation pertinent to minority groups. Other spinoff benefits that mi-
nority ownership encourages are the employing and promoting of
minorities, and the use of minority vendors.
1. Employment Of the seventeen broadcasters who responded
to the question about the racial composition of their workforce, thir-
teen had staffs with greater than 70% minorities.17 1 Seven had staffs
which were 80% or more African-American.' 72 The tendency of Af-
rican-American owned stations to employ more minorities than
White-owned, Black-formatted stations has been confirmed by other
studies. For example, a study conducted by Paul Milton Gold of
African-American-owned and White-owned Black-formatted sta-
tions found that 82% of the Black-owned stations had African-
American general managers as compared to 27% of the White-
owned stations.'"3 Nearly 74% of the Black-owned stations had
more than 75% African-American employees compared to fewer
than 38% of the White-owned, Black-formatted stations. 7 4
Some of the broadcasters indicated that they tried to ensure that
their African-American employees were given maximum opportu-
nity. One broadcaster indicated that he helped a highly qualified
African-American woman, who had been in a dead-end position
under the previous ownership, to become a station manager. The
same broadcaster stated that he was helping one long-time African-
American employee, who had not been promoted for several years
170. Id. at 45.
171. Charles Sherrell, Paul Major, Jim Hutchinson, Willie Davis (throughout his
broadcasting corporation), Howard Sanders, George Clay, Ronald Davenport, Glenn
Mahone, Cathy Hughes, William Shearer, Mutter Evans, Pierre Sutton (in New York)
and Bennie Turner reported that they had over 70%o minority employees. Telephone
interviews, see infra Appendix A.
172. Mutter Evans, Bennie Turner, Howard Sanders, George Clay, Glenn Mahone,
Cathy Hughes, Charles Sherrell and Jim Hutchinson reported more than 80% minority
employees. Telephone interviews, see infra Appendix A.
173. P. Gold, Public Interest Programming Service to Minority Committee by Mi-
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prior to the interviewee's ownership, acquire a radio station.17 5 An-
other broadcaster deliberately attempted to integrate the adminis-
trative staff of his station. Previously, African-Americans had been
employed only as disc jockeys. 176 Even an owner whose station is in
a community with less than 1% minority population actively re-
cruited other minorities, who today comprise 8% of her staff.177
2. Public service Many of the owners surveyed have a sense of
commitment to the African-American community that may influence
their programming decisions, even though the primary factor in
such decisions are market demands. For broadcasters with Black-
formatted stations purchased from non-minority owners, this has re-
sulted in a greater willingness to make the station accessible to com-
munity organizations, to increase community service
announcements, or to provide other services over-the-air. While
filfilling a need, these activities did not generate revenue and prior
owners either did not recognize them as important or were unwill-
ing to do them. For example, a broadcaster who owns a Black-
formatted station in a southern city began broadcasting obituaries
as a public service because she recognized that many African-Ameri-
can families could not afford the fee charged by local newspapers. 17 8
The enhanced commitment of African-American broadcasters to
serving the African-American community, even in predominantly
White markets, was also reflected in attempts to include information
regarding the viewpoints or concerns of minorities, even though the
majority of the programming was not minority-targeted. A broad-
caster in Hart, Michigan, which has a minority population of less
than 1% , provided in-depth coverage of Martin Luther King, Jr. on
his birthday and tried to include other pertinent information when-
ever possible. 17 9
V. Are Minority Preference Policies Effective?
A. General Impact
All of the broadcasters felt that the FCC's policies to encourage
minority broadcasting were successful in improving opportunities to
purchase stations. Eleven of the 20 broadcasters interviewed had
used the FCC's minority ownership policies in the acquisition of
175. Telephone interview with Ragan Henry, see infra Appendix A.
176. Telephone interview with Ronald Davenport, see infra Appendix A.
177. Telephone interview with Nancy Waters, see infra Appendix A.
178. Telephone interview with Mutter Evans, see infra Appendix A.
179. Telephone interview with Nancy Waters, see infra Appendix A.
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their stations. Eight were involved in transactions with tax certifi-
cates, five had acquired stations through distress sales, and one had
acquired a station where a minority preference in a comparative
hearing was instrumental. 80 Many of the station owners attributed
the ability to use one of the preference policies with their ability to
purchase a station. Many associated the preference policies with the
willingness of the seller to consider a minority purchaser, or with
opening the door to an opportunity.
Jim Hutchinson is believed to be the first minority to use the pref-
erence policy in a distress sale. Hutchinson was trying to purchase
WLTA-AM in Gary, Indiana whose license was being challenged be-
cause of its policies of broadcasting material which was racially of-
fensive. After the city of Gary indicated that the shutting down of
the station would be a great disservice to the city, the FCC agreed to
let the station sell the property to a minority within 30 days.' 8' Simi-
lar stories have been reported by other owners, regardless of the
markets they operate in and the number of stations which they own.
Willie Davis believed that the tax certificate significantly enhanced
his ability to acquire at least three stations.18 2 Bennie Turner
credited the distress sale with being responsible for his ability to
acquire two stations in Columbia, Mississippi where otherwise he
would not have been able to get the cooperation of the prior own-
ers.' 8 3 Nancy Waters, whose purchase was adjudicated in West Michi-
gan, attributed her ability to acquire a station in Hart, Michigan to
the preference policy in the comparative hearing process. 8 4
In short, the policies have been effective in helping minorities to
gain access to the informal network of influential members of the
broadcasting industry, which allows them to learn more easily about
and participate in sales. Because sellers now are anxious to gain the
advantages of the tax certificate, brokers have increased their con-
tacts with potential minority purchasers. 8 5
The greatest impact of the policies has been the growth in owner-
ship among African-American broadcasters. As the executive direc-
tor of NABOB said, "Before 1978, there were approximately 80
radio stations and one TV station. Now there are some 184 radio
180. Telephone interviews, see infra Appendix A.
181. Telephone interview with Jim Hutchinson, see infra Appendix A.
182. Telephone interview with Willie Davis, see infra Appendix A.
183. Telephone interview with Bennie Turner, see infra Appendix A.
184. Telephone interview with Nancy Waters, see infra Appendix A. However, when
Ms. Waters applied initially, she made no effort to obtain a preference because of her
race or gender.
185. Telephone interview with Jim Blackburn, see infra Appendix A.
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stations and 15 television stations. This growth is directly attributa-
ble to the FCC's policies."' s86
B. Sham Transactions
A by-product of the minority preference policies has been the de-
velopment of sham transactions. Sham transactions are those where
a minority, who has no intention of operating or retaining a busi-
ness enterprise, allows herself to be presented as the titular head of
an organization (i.e., in control of the voting stock) in order that her
White partners can receive the benefit of the minority preference
policy. In these transactions the minority typically makes no sub-
stantive equity contribution and intends to sell her interest once the
license is awarded. Because there is never any sustained minority
ownership, these policies are a sham.
The press has sometimes publicized these transactions asjustifica-
tions for ending the preference policies; however, this would throw
out the baby with the bath water. New regulations are needed to
curb these abuses. However, suggestions for regulations to halt
shams, while not impeding sincere minorities' entry into the broad-
casting industry, probably are best developed after greater dialogue
between minority broadcasters and the FCC. One suggestion might
be to institute policies requiring an owner who obtains a station
through a minority preference to retain ownership for a certain
amount of time. Another might be to require a certain minimum
amount or percentage of equity to be contributed by minority own-
ers who use preferences. However, policy-makers must take care
that such policies do not arbitrarily establish equity thresholds,
which will impede sincere minorities who wish to participate in
large-scale broadcasting transactions.
VI. Conclusion
This Current Topic has analyzed African-American ownership in
the radio broadcasting industry in order to clarify the necessity of
the FCC's minority preference policies. This study has shown that
years of racial discrimination directed against African-Americans
prevented them from being able to acquire high quality stations in
the early years of the regulated broadcasting industry when the ma-
jority of frequencies were allocated. The FCC's policy of preferring
410
186. Telephone interview with James L. Winston, supra note 2.
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to renew licenses, as well lender financing policies that require cer-
tain levels of capital and broadcasting experience, have contributed
to the gross underrepresentation of minorities in the broadcasting
industry.
Minority preference policies are necessary to address past dis-
crimination and ensure that minority viewpoints are represented on
the public airwaves. Race neutral policies-such as ascertainment
or encouraging minority employment-and marketplace strategies
have both failed to solve these problems.
The more than doubling of minority licenses since minority own-
ership policies were initiated can largely be attributed to the exist-
ence of these preference programs. While this Current Topic has
focused primarily on the broadcasting industry, similar studies re-
garding other industries are also likely to show that minority under-
representation is due to racial discrimination rather than to the
failure of minority groups to be attracted to a particular industry.
As one broadcaster said,
Years ago it was stated that minorities could not be successful opera-
tors of franchises. However, once the door was opened, this predic-
tion was proved wrong. A similar situation exists in broadcasting.
Once the FCC's minority preference policies created the opportunity,
we were eager to enter the industry.' 8 7
411
187. Telephone interview with Glenn Mahone, see infra at Appendix A.



























































































* includes four in negotiation
** a television station
* reinterviewed during April, 1990.
Vol. 8:380, 1990
Are Minority Preferences Necessary
Appendix B: Questionnaire
1. Please indicate the call letters and location of all of the stations
which you own and whether they are AM or FM.
2. How many years have you been in the broadcasting business?
3. When did you acquire your first station? At the time of its
acquisition, did you have any broadcasting experience? If so,
please describe.
4. Did you use any of the FCC's minority ownership preference
policies when you acquired your stations? If so, please describe the
impact of the policy on your acquisition.
5. Generally, do you think that the FCC's minority ownership
preference policies have impacted minority ownership in the
broadcasting industry? Please explain.
6. Which of the FCC's minority ownership preference policies do you
think is the most effective and why?
7. What changes would you recommend in the FCC's minority
ownership preference policies to make them more effective?
8. Have you personally encountered any racial discrimination when
you attempted to acquire a station? If so, please explain.
9. Have you encountered any racial discrimination in the day-to-day
operation of your station? If so, please explain.
10. What do you think is the greatest obstacle generally facing
minorities when they attempt to enter the broadcasting industry?
11. Have you sold any stations in the past three years? If so, what was
your primary reason for selling? Were any of your stations sold to
minorities?
12. What is the ownership structure of your broadcasting business (i.e.
corporation, partnership, "S" corporation)?
13. What percentage do you own personally?
14. What percentage is minority owned?
15. What programming format do you use on your stations? Was there
any significant change in the format after you acquired the station?
16. What percentage of your staff is minority?
17. Has the percentage of minority employees increased or decreased
since your ownership?
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